We study the effect of heterogeneous growth in demand on resource extraction. Using the Great Fish War framework of Levhari and Mirman (1980) , we show that heterogeneity in demand growth has a profound effect on both non-cooperative (Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg) and cooperative solutions.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the use of global materials has increased 8-fold (Krausmann et al., 2009 ). This increase in world demand ranges from natural resources such as fish to energy-related resources. See Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix A. Moreover, the growth of demand for natural resources varies considerably among countries. For instance, the annual fish consumption growth rate for the years 1999-2013 is only 1.06% for the US, but 3.43% for China. Similarly, for total primary energy consumption, the annual growth rate for the years 2006-2013 is negative for the US (−0.44%), but positive for both India (5.14%) and China (7.16%). Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix A further illustrate this heterogeneity of demand growth among countries for both fish and primary energy consumption. In view of such heterogeneity with the particular case of China's exploding demand for resources, it is important to understand how the anticipation of growing demand affects extraction and thus welfare.
In this paper, we study the effect of heterogeneous growth in demand on extraction. To that end, we extend the Great Fish War framework (Levhari and Mirman, 1980) to a situation in which demand for the resource grows exogenously and heterogeneously. 1 Specifically, we consider the case of two countries with heterogeneous growth in demand. The growth in demand is assumed exogenous in order to identify clearly the effect of growing demand on behavior, thereby abstracting from the effect of natural resource utilization on demand growth.
In order to provide a general view of the effect of demand growth on extraction, we solve for non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. Under non-cooperation, both Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg frameworks are considered. Under Cournot-Nash non-cooperation, a higher demand for one country leads both countries to extract more. In contrast, in a Stackelberg environment, a higher demand for the leader induces him to increase extraction while the follower reduces his. On the other hand, an increase in the demand of the follower yields an increase in the follower's extraction without any effect on the leader's. Next, under cooperation, each country increases extraction along with an increase in his own demand, but decreases extraction when demand of the other country decreases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. Section 3 provides Cournot-Nash non-cooperative and cooperative solutions, which are then analyzed in Section 4. We then extend the analysis to the Stackelberg environment in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
The Model
Consider the Great Fish War (Levhari and Mirman, 1980) dynamic game in which two countries derive utility from the utilization of a common-pool resource. Let y t be the stock of the resource at time t. In the absence of extraction, the stock evolves according to the following rule,
where α ∈ (0, 1]. From (1), the evolution of the stock applies to both renewable resources (i.e., α ∈ (0, 1)) and depletable resources (i.e., α = 1).
At time t, for i = 1, 2, country i utilizes q i,t units of the stock. Using (1), the evolution of the stock under exploitation is given by
where a total of q 1,t +q 2,t is utilized at time t. For country i at time t, utilizing q i,t yields utility u i (q i,t ) = g i,t ln q i,t where g i,t > 0 reflects country i's present level of demand.
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In order to study the effect of exogenous and heterogeneous growth in demand on behavior, we assume that the demand parameter evolves over 2 In Levhari and Mirman (1980) , g i,t = 1 for all i and t. 4 time. For i = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2, . . .,
where λ i ∈ [0, 1) and θ i > 0 are country-specific parameters.
3 Given the initial value g i,0 > 0, the complete solution to (3) is
and the system converges asymptotically to the steady state
Hence, from (5), the difference in demand between the two countries converges asymptotically to
Non-cooperation vs. Cooperation
In this section, we first characterize the Cournot-Nash non-cooperative solution. We then provide the solution when the two countries cooperate.
Definition 3.1 states the feedback-Nash equilibrium in the infinite-horizon case. To simplify notation, we drop the subscript t and we use a hat sign to mark the evolution over time. Specifically, g i andĝ i represent the level of demand today and tomorrow, respectively. Analogously, y andŷ = (y − q 1 − q 2 ) α are stock today and tomorrow, respectively. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the discount factor. The superscript N stands for Non-cooperation.
and where, for any {y , g i , g j },
Proposition 3.2 presents the Cournot-Nash non-cooperative solution.
Proposition 3.2. In the feedback Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
where
Proof. See Appendix B.
Having characterized the non-cooperative solution, we now turn to the case of cooperation. When countries cooperate, individual extractions are chosen so as to maximize the sum of present and future discounted utilities, i.e., {Q C 1 (y, g 1 , g 2 ), Q C 2 (y, g 2 , g 1 )} are the optimal solutions consistent with the Bellman equation
subject to q 1 + q 2 < y. Here, the superscript C stands for Cooperation. Proposition 3.3 characterizes the cooperative solution. As in the noncooperative case, extraction policies depend on both countries' demand parameters. However, the effect of demand growth on extraction is different between non-cooperation and cooperation.
Proposition 3.3. From (10), for i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
From Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, it follows that, compared to cooperation, non-cooperation induces both countries to extract more, which yields a lower level of the resource stock in the steady state. Remark 3.4 restates the tragedy of the commons in the context of heterogeneous growth in demand.
Remark 3.4. From (8) and (11),
In the subsequent sections, we discuss the effect of demand growth on the equilibrium. We proceed as follows. We first consider policy functions under Cournot-Nash non-cooperation and cooperation. We then extend the analysis to the Stackelberg environment as done in Levhari and Mirman (1980) . The discussion on the steady state with a particular focus on welfare is relegated to Appendix C.
Extraction Policies
In this section, we study how the presence of heterogeneous growth in demand affects extraction policies. We begin by considering the intermediate case in which the level of demand is different across the two countries, i.e., g 1 = g 2 , but without growth in demand. Proposition 4.1 states that in the presence of differences in demand, non-cooperation distorts the allocation of the resource between the two countries in favor of the smaller country. Specifically, the cooperative solution allocates more resource toward the largest country whereas in the non-cooperative solution, each country extracts the same amount each period, regardless of demand size. 
2. Under cooperation, for i = 1, 2,
Proof. Evaluating (8) and (11) at λ i = 1 and θ i = 0 yields (14) and (15), respectively.
Having considered the intermediate case of heterogeneity in demand with no growth, we now study how the non-cooperative solution compares to the cooperative solution when there is heterogeneous growth in demand. Proposition 4.2 states that in the presence of heterogeneous growth in demand, similar to the case of no growth, the cooperative solution yields higher extraction for the country with the largest present size of demand. However, unlike the no-growth case, under non-cooperation, countries with heterogeneous growth in demand extract unequally. Nevertheless, the allocation of the resource between the two countries is distorted in a different way. Indeed, under non-cooperation, countries take account of growing demand (i.e., the terms A 
Under non-cooperation, from (8) and (9), Q
2. Under cooperation, from (11) and (12),
Proposition 4.3 provides the effect of an increase in the size of demand on the cooperative and the non-cooperative solutions. Consider first an increase in the current demand of one country (part (a)). Under cooperation, such a change increases extraction for the growing country, but reduces extraction of the other country. However, under non-cooperation, both countries increase their resource extraction. Consider next an increase in the future demand of one country (part (b)). Under cooperation, each country reduces present extraction to preserve the stock of resources for the future enlarged demand.
Under non-cooperation, the country whose future demand size has increased, cuts current resource extraction. However, the other country increases extraction in anticipation to lower availability of the resource in future. Hence, heterogeneity in demand growth has an effect in over-exploitation of the resources and the tragedy of the commons. The reason is that, under noncooperation, countries' competition to extract resources is exacerbated when they anticipate higher future demand from their competitor. 5 We can also define these conditions in terms of the parameters of the model. Specifically, g i > g j is equivalent to
and
Under non-cooperation, from (8) and (9), (a)
In order to understand better the distortion resulting from non-cooperation pointed out in Proposition 4.3, we consider each country's share of extraction. Let r C i and r N i be country i's share of extraction under cooperation and non-cooperation, respectively. Hence, from (8) and (11), for i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
Under cooperation, an increase in the demand size of a country increases his own share of extraction, and thus reduces the other country's share of extraction. These effects hold under non-cooperation as well. In other words, Proposition 4.3 states that, under non-cooperation, in response to an increase in the demand size of country i, country j increases its extraction, his share decreases due to the greater increase in the demand size of his rival, i.e., country i. Under the cooperative solution, an increase in the future demand size of a country does not affect the countries' present shares of extractions. However, under non-cooperation, the share of the country whose future demand size has increased decreases due to the strategic reaction of his rival.
Remark 4.4. For i, j = 1, 2, i = j,
Stackelberg
In this section, we extend our analysis to the Stackelberg environment.
6
Proposition 5.1 characterizes the Stackelberg solution. The subscript L stands for leader whereas the subscript F stands for follower.
Proposition 5.1. Under Stackelberg, the leader extracts
and the follower extracts
where, for z ∈ {L, F },
Proposition 5.2 provides the condition under which the leader extracts more than the follower. Then, under Stackelberg, from (21) and (22)
Proposition 5.3 states the effect of an increase in the size of demand on extractions. Comparing Proposition 5.3 with Proposition 4.3 provides interesting insights about the difference between Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg.
In particular, the follower reduces his consumption along with an increase in the leader's present demand. The reason is that the follower does not react strategically to an increase in the leader's demand. Instead, by observing the increase in the leader's demand, the follower reduces his extraction to preserve the resource for the future. However, an increase in follower's demand does not affect the leader's extraction.
Remark 5.4 presents the effect of a change in one countries demand on the country's share of extraction. Let r L and r F be leader's and follower's share of extraction, respectively. Hence, from (21) and (22),
An increase in the demand size of a country increases his own share of extraction, and thus reduces the other country's share of extraction.
Remark 5.4. Under Stackelberg, from (25) and (26),
1.
Final Remark
We study the effect of heterogeneous and exogenous growth in demand on extraction of a common pool resource. Consideration of heterogeneous demand growth in exploitation of resources is a relevant line of research as historical data shows that the consumption of resources is growing over time and this consumption growth is highly heterogeneous among different countries. See Appendix A.
We extend the Great Fish War framework of Levhari and Mirman (1980) by accounting for heterogeneous growth in demand. We compare the noncooperative solution (Cournot and Stackelberg) with the cooperative solution. Our results suggest that heterogeneity in demand growth has a profound effect on both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. Moreover, the presence of heterogeneous growth in demand may exacerbate the tragedy of the commons because the anticipation of higher demand from rivalrous countries induces each country to increase extraction. Finally, although the cooperative solution allocates more resources toward the largest country, the non-cooperative solution ignores such differences, i.e., each country extracts the same amount regardless of demand size.
Our analysis is an exploratory attempt to account for heterogeneity in demand growth in the most parsimonious setting. We acknowledge that some of our results are reminiscent of our assumption of considering an exogenous linear demand growth rule that appears in the countries' welfare as a multiplicative term. Some extensions can be envisioned in future work to enhance our understanding of the impact of demand growth on resource extraction. Specifically, we could extend the present analysis to an endogenous growth model by linking the growth rate of demand with past and present extractions. That is, as countries extract more, they develop new sectors of production of goods and services, which in turn requires higher demand for natural resources and energy-related resources. 
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B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We conjecture that country i's value function has the form,
Plugging (27) into the objective function of (6) yields the dynamic maximization problem
Plugging and (27) into the objective function of (28) yields the value function
which needs to agree with the conjecture as defined by (27), i.e.,
7 The conjecture can be inferred by solving the problem recursively as done in Levhari and Mirman (1980) . By solving recursively, one realizes that the value function is always linear in ln y. Moreover, the limit of the solution for the t-period game as t goes to infinity is the solution to the infinite-horizon game that we consider. Hence, there is a unique feedback-Nash equilibrium in the class of strategies that are linear in the stock.
Given that αδλ i < 1, equation (32) implies that
which, using (30) and the fact that (8) and (9). Proof of Proposition 3.3. We conjecture that the cooperative value function has the form,
Plugging (27) into (10) yields
Plugging (36) into (37) 20 yields the value function
which needs to agree with the conjecture as defined by (36), i.e.,
Solving equation (41) 
which, using (39) and the fact that (11) and (12). Proof of Proposition 5.1. We conjecture that the value function of the follower has the form,
Using (45), the value function is rewritten as
which yields
Given (48), the leader's maximization problem is
We conjecture that the value function of the leader has the form,
Plugging (50) into the objective function of (49) yields
. Plugging (45) and (54) into the objective 22 function of (46) yields the value function
which needs to agree with the conjecture as defined by (45), i.e.,
Given that αδλ i < 1, equation (56) implies that
and thus
. Similarly, it can be shown that
C Steady State
This section compares the steady state between Cournot-Nash non-cooperation and cooperation. We first consider the effect of heterogeneity in demand growth on extraction and stock in the steady state. We then study the effect of demand growth on the welfare of individual countries as well as the global 23 welfare.
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C.1 Extraction and Stock
Although demand growth (and heterogeneity) has a profound effect on the equilibrium values for extraction, the non-cooperative steady state turns out to be unaffected by the level of demand and the exogenous parameters governing demand growth. Interestingly, growth in demand does have an effect on the cooperative solution.
Remark C.1. In the non-cooperative steady state, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j
is the steady state stock.
Unlike the non-cooperative case, heterogeneity in demand growth has an effect on the steady state of the cooperative solution. However, the effect is present only in the allocation of the stock since the steady state stock remains unaffected by growth in demand.
Remark C.2. In the cooperative steady state, for
where g 1 , g 2 are given by (5) and
is the steady state stock. 8 We wish to thank a reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
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C.2 Welfare
Note first that because of the log utility function, utility levels are negative when consumption is below one. Although negative utility has no bearing for our previous analysis on extraction policies, it does have an effect when studying the effect of demand growth on welfare. Indeed, holding everything else constant, an increase in demand size must increase instantaneous payoffs, which is not possible for consumption below one. The law of motion is thus modified in order to proceed with the welfare analysis. Specifically, (1) is rewritten as
where η > 1 allows the stock of the resource to be larger than one at the steady state. Specifically,
We also assume that η is large enough to make consumption at the steady state larger than one. This assumption has no effect on the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions because the parameter η is only found in the constant term of the value function.
In the non-cooperative case, a higher growth rate in demand for one country leads to higher welfare for that same country, but it has no effect on the welfare of the rivalrous country. On the other hand, under cooperation, a higher growth rate in demand for any country has a positive effect on welfare. One of the reasons is that the steady state stock is unaffected by growth in demand. Hence, in the Great Fish War model, a higher demand has no effect on the steady state availability of the resource. 
since we assume that η is large enough to yield a consumption above one, i.e., 1−αδ 2−αδ y N > 1. Moreover,
Next, under cooperation,
that is
where, for i = 1, 2, i = j, Q C i (y C , g i , g j ) = g i (1−αδ)y C g i +g j > 1 since we assume that η is large enough to yield consumption above one. Using (72), 
= lnQ
